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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ALEX MONTIEL,

:

Case No. 20030310-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to the State's arguments in its response to Alex Montiel's (Montiel)
opening brief, Montiel's conviction should be reversed because the trial court abused its
discretion by rejecting the proposed plea agreement. Further, even though Montiel
properly preserved his claim for appeal, this Court should reverse regardless of
preservation because the trial court's abuse of discretion was plain error and Montiel did
not invite the error.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE MONTIEL'S CONVICTION
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
REJECTING THE PLEA AGREEMENT

Contrary to the State's argument, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting
the plea because: (A) it failed to consider all legally relevant factors, (B) it exceeded the
scope of its authority, and (C) it applied its discretion arbitrarily. Moreover, this Court
should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial.

A.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to Consider All Legally
Relevant Factors,
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider all legally relevant

factors because: (1) although Utah law has not yet defined what legally relevant factors a
trial court must consider before rejecting a plea, other jurisdictions agree a trial court
must at least consider the plea under the circumstances of the case before rejecting it, and
(2) the trial court did not consider the plea under the circumstances of Montiel's case
before rejecting it, but relied instead on a fixed policy formed from personal bias.
1.

Although Utah Law Does Not Yet Define What Factors a Trial Court Must
Consider Before Rejecting a Plea, Other Jurisdictions Agree a Trial Court
Must At Least Consider the Circumstances of the Particular Case.
As explained in footnote 2 of Montiel's opening brief and reinforced by the

State's response, Utah law has not yet defined what factors a trial court should consider
before rejecting a plea. See Aplt. Br. at 8 n. 2; Aple. Br. at 19-23.l Thus, Montiel's
argument relies on case law from other jurisdictions for guidance. See Arndt v. First
Interstate Bank of Utah . 1999 UT 91,Tfl7, 991 P.2d 584 (noting if Utah case law "is not
determinative," then court must look to "case law from other jurisdictions for guidance");

1

See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (stating "court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty"
without defining parameters of discretion); State v. Mane. 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (holding court did not abuse discretion by rejecting plea after defendant
testified "he had no memory" of his actions because "[n]othing in [Rule 11(e) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure] requires a court to accept a guilty plea and defendant has
cited no case authority for that proposition")); State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13,^16,
17 P.3d 1153 (stating, without defining parameters of discretion, trial court did not err by
refusing to enforce plea and noting plea "failed to adequately address" restitution).
2

State v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329,^12, 37 P.3d 1197 (turning to "other jurisdictions
[that] have decided similar cases" because matter of first impression in Utah).
In its response, the State argues case law from other jurisdictions is not helpful
because there is no "list of factors" to consider before rejecting a plea that "enjoys
universal acceptance." Aple. Br. at 23, 25. However, in the cases cited by the State and
Montiel, one factor is universal—the trial court must exercise sound discretion, meaning
it must consider the plea under the circumstances of the case before rejecting it. See
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (holding trial "court may reject a plea
in exercise of sound judicial discretion"); State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1189-90 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998) (holding Utah courts "review a trial court's acceptance or rejection of a
guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard"); Black's Law Dictionary 479 (7 th ed.
1999) (defining judicial discretion as the "exercise of judgment by a judge or court based
on what is fair under the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law").2

2

See, e.g.. United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447-48 (5 th Cir. 2002) (holding
court did not abuse discretion by rejecting plea because could not assume state would
prosecute and too lenient under circumstances and guidelines); United States v. TorresEchavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding no abuse because court found
plea "inadequately reflected" seriousness of returning after deportation to violate law and
undermined guidelines, and leniency previously encouraged defendant to violate law);
United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding court exercised
sound judicial discretion by rejecting for no factual basis because defendant lied during
plea hearing); United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1458 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding
court exercised reasonable discretion by rejecting because plea prevented prosecution of
individuals for fraud against Government and severely limited fines); United States v.
Moore, 637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8 th Cir. 1981) (holding court must act within "scope of its
broad discretion"); United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5 th Cir. 1977) (holding no
3

Specifically, a trial court cannot reject a plea based on a fixed policy. See United
States v. Robertson. 45 F.3d 1423, 1439 (10 th Cir. 1995) ("In our judgement, rejecting a
plea implicating both branches of government solely out of concern for the district
court's scheduling is, under the facts of this case, impermissible."); Hockaday v. United
States. 359 A.2d 146, 148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding "trial court must identify good
reasons for" rejecting plea and "blanket refusal to hear from either side concerning the

abuse because plea did not allow "sentence commensurate with" offense and dangerous
character where defendant charged with house burglary at night while occupants asleep
and had violent record); People v. Jasper. 17 P.3d 807, 812 (Colo. 2001) (holding court
must exercise "independent judgement in deciding" each case); Daniels v. State, 453
N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ind. 1983) (holding no abuse because court carefully considered
evidence, was aware of victim's feelings, recognized arranging plea took time and effort,
and was concerned with respecting statute); Stacks v. State. 372 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1978) (holding court must evaluate "circumstances of the case and determine
the propriety of the particular bargain"); State v. Clanton. 612 P.2d 662, 665 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1980) ("[J]udicial discretion implies the liberty to act as a judge should act,
applying the rules and analogies of the law to the facts found after weighing and
examining the evidence."); People v. Grove. 566 N.W.2d 547, 557 (Mich. 1997)
(holding court may reject if plea is "'too light a sentence under the circumstances of the
case'" (citation omitted)); Sparks v. State. 759 P.2d 180, 184 (Nev. 1988) (holding court
must consider: "(a) fairness to the defense, such as protection against harassment; (b)
fairness to the prosecution interest, as in avoiding a disposition that does not serve due
and legitimate prosecutorial interests; (c) protection of the sentencing authority reserved
to the judge" (emphasis omitted)); State v. Southworth. 52 P.3d 987, 997 (N.M. Ct. App.
2002) (holding court may reject if plea is "'too light a sentence under the circumstances
of the case'" (citations omitted)); State v. Hines. 919 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Term. 1995)
(holding no abuse because court found facts, "even when mitigating circumstances were
considered, should be decided by a jury"); State v. Reuschel. 312 A.2d 739, 743 (Vt.
1973) (holding plea "should not be refused without good reason"); State v. Sears . 542
S.E.2d 863, 867 (W. Va. 2000) (holding court must consider "in light of the entire
criminal event and given the defendant's prior criminal record" whether plea allows court
to dispose of case in manner commensurate with seriousness of charges and
character/background of defendant).
4

proffered plea constituted an abuse of discretion" (citations omitted)); State v. Hager, 630
N.W.2d 828, 833, 837 (Iowa 2001) (holding discretion to reject "is broad but not
unlimited" and "refusing to consider the terms of the plea agreement solely because it
was presented after the deadline" was abuse). In other words:
Rule 11 permits district courts to assess the wisdom of plea
bargains; this grant of power carries with it the duty to
exercise it responsibly. When a court establishes a broad
policy based on events unrelated to the individual case before
it, no discretion has been exercised. When dealing with
issues as fundamental as a person's freedom or imprisonment,
our judicial system can-and must-give every case
independent consideration.
United States v. Miller. 722 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1983). Thus, this Court should
reverse because the trial court did not consider the circumstances of Montiel's case but
rejected the plea based on its fixed policy to never waive firearms enhancements. R.
200:4-7; see Section I.A.2.
2.

The Trial Court Did Not Consider the Plea Under the Circumstances of
Montiel's Case But Rejected the Plea Based On a Fixed Policy.
The State argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it considered

"alternative grounds for rejecting the plea." Aple. Br. at 14. Specifically, the State
presents a list of factors it claims the trial court considered before rejecting the plea. IdL
at 26-27. However, this list actually represents factors the trial court refused to consider
under its fixed policy, factors not demonstrated by the record, and disguised restatements
of the trial court's fixed policy.

5

First, the trial court did not consider the "prosecutor's concerns regarding the
strength of his evidence11 or "defense counsel's reference to judicial economy." Aple. Br.
at 26-27. Although the prosecutor repeatedly told the trial court he did not have enough
evidence to guarantee a conviction, the trial court refused to consider this factor because,
"Well, I don't waive firearms enhancements, folks. You plead them, they're stuck unless
I'm convinced that there was some mistake in pleading." R. 200:4. Similarly, although
Montiel told the trial court judicial economy favored accepting the plea, the trial court
refused to consider this factor because, "I don't care about judicial economy when people
are alleged to have used firearms." R. 200:5.
Second, the trial court did not consider the "seriousness of defendant's crime" or
whether the sentence was "commensurate to the charged crime." Aple. Br. at 14, 27.
Montiel was charged with aggravated robbery with an enhancement for committing the
offense with two or more persons. R. 4-5. Although possession of a firearm was one
element of the charged crime and one circumstance of the alleged event, it was not the
only element or circumstance. R. 4-5; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) (listing
elements of aggravated robbery); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999) (listing elements of
robbery); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2002) (listing elements of enhancement
for committing crime in concert with two or more people). Thus, the trial court, to
properly exercise its discretion, should have looked beyond the alleged firearm to
consider the elements of the charged crime, the circumstances of the case, and Montiel's

6

character and history. R. 200:4-7; see Aplt. Br. at 9-14.
Third, the trial court did not consider "the fact that the agreement reduced a first
degree felony . . . to a third." Aple. Br. at 27. During the plea hearing, the trial court
made no mention of the crime, let alone the degree of the crime. R. 200:4-7. He was
concerned only with the firearms enhancement. IcL Had a gun not been alleged, the trial
court would have been open to a plea and considered the details of the plea offered. Id.
However, because a firearm was alleged and the trial court did not "waive firearms
enhancements," the trial court was blinded to all other details of the plea. Id.
Fourth, the trial court could not have considered the alleged victim's feelings
because it did not know those feelings. Aple. Br. at 14, 27. Whether the victim
approved of the plea is not clear from the record. R. 200:6-7. Although the prosecutor
said he had spoken to the victim, the trial court prevented him from telling exactly what
the victim felt and whether the victim approved of a plea akin to the current plea. I d .
This Court should not infer from the absence of evidence that the victim did not approve
of the plea. See, e.g., Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 744
P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah 1987) (holding "it cannot be assumed that facts exist" in the
absence of evidence). Besides, even if this Court were to infer facts from the absence of
evidence, the more logical inference would be the victim approved of the plea. See State
v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, 44 P.3d 756 (holding victim's right, "[u]pon request, to be
informed of, be present at, and to be heard at important criminal justice hearings" extends

7

to "change of plea hearing[s]" and "must be 'protected'" (citations omitted)).
Fifth, the State's claim that the trial court considered the "lack of congruity
between the prosecutor's claim that defendant 'is a dangerous person' [that] should be
lock[ed] up' and the prosecutor's willingness to have defendant plead," confuses the
record. Aple. Br. at 27. The prosecutor proposed the plea because of his belief that
Montiel was a "dangerous person." R. 200:5-6. Specifically, the prosecutor accepted the
plea because it was the only way to guarantee incarceration. IdL However, the trial court
refused to consider this reasoning, regardless of the prosecutor's heightened involvement
with the case, because it would not waive the firearms enhancement. IdL; see United
States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1438 (10 th Cir. 1995) ("Courts do not know which
charges are best initiated at which time, which allocation of prosecutorial resources is
most efficient, or the relative strengths of various cases and charges." (citations
omitted)); Sandy v. Fifth Judicial Dist. C t . 935 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Nev. 1997) (same).
Sixth, the "prosecutor's failure to persuade the court that 'there was some mistake
in pleading' aggravated robbery" was not a factor considered but an ultimatum offered by
the trial court. Aple. Br. at 26-27. The trial court said it would not waive "the firearms
enhancement" unless "you can tell me you don't have any evidence . . . or there wasn't a
firearm or your witness is lying." R. 200:5. This was not a guideline by which to
conduct further plea negotiations, but a definitive ruling that there would be no plea. I(L
at 4-5. When outlining the plea, the prosecutor made clear he had not made a mistake in

8

charging Montiel with use of a firearm and he did not believe his witnesses were lying.
Id. Instead, he was proposing the plea because he did not have sufficient evidence to
prove use of a firearm at trial. Id, Accordingly, by saying it would only waive a firearms
enhancement if there was a mistake in pleading or no evidence to support the charge, the
trial court made clear it would not consider a plea at all in this case. Id, at 4-7.
R

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Exceeding the Scope of Its
Authority.
Although it recognizes a trial court abuses its discretion by "effectively nullifying

the State's right to prosecute," Utah case law has not yet defined the scope of a trial
court's discretion to reject a plea proposed and agreed to by the State. See Utah Const.
Art. V, Sec. 1 ("The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments,. . . and no person charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining
to either of the others."); Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (holding trial court abused discretion
by accepting plea over State's objection because it "effectively nullified] the State's
right to prosecute defendant"). Accordingly, Montiel looks to case law from other
jurisdictions for guidance. Aplt. Br. at 14-21; see, Arndt, 1999 UT 91 at ^[17 (noting if
Utah case law "is not determinative," then court must look to "case law from other
jurisdictions for guidance"); Galvan, 2001 UT App 329 at ^{12 (turning to "other
jurisdictions [that] have decided similar cases" because matter of first impression in
Utah). Specifically, Montiel cites cases from jurisdictions that share Utah's interest in
9

protecting the State's right to prosecute. Aplt. Br. at 14-21.
Contrary to the State's claim, the cases cited by Montiel, including United States
v. Ammidown. 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), do not dissolve the trial court's discretion
to reject a plea. Aple. Br. at 32; see Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 621-22 (recognizing trial
court may reject plea agreements according to its "reasoned exercise of discretion").
Rather, these cases, while recognizing the trial court's discretion in sentencing, also
recognize the State's right to prosecute and the prosecutor's superior ability to "evaluate
the government's prosecution resources and the number of cases it is able to prosecute."
Ammidown. 497 F.2d at 621; see Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1438 ("Courts do not know
which charges are best initiated at which time, which allocation of prosecutorial
resources is most efficient, or the relative strengths of various cases and charges."
(citations omitted)). Thus, these cases conclude separation of powers and judicial
economy dictate that the trial court should follow the prosecutor's plea decisions "in the
overwhelming number of cases." Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 621; Sandy, 935 P.2d at 1151
(noting prosecutors have discretion to determine whether plea should be accepted due to
"insufficiency of trial evidence, doubt as to the admissibility of certain evidence," "the
need to bring another felon to justice," "uncertain success or conserving prosecutorial
resources, or any other separate factor necessitating acceptance").
This reasoning directly comports with Utah's concern in preventing trial courts
from using their discretion to "nullify[] the State's right to prosecute." See Turner, 980

10

P.2d at 1190; see Aple. Br. at 30 (recognizing "prosecutor has broad discretion" in the
"decision to indict, allege specific charges, or dismiss charges" (quotations and citations
omitted)). Accordingly, Utah, like other jurisdictions that protect the State's right to
prosecute, should weigh the trial court's discretion to reject a plea against the State's
right to prosecute when establishing the scope of a trial court's discretion. See United
States v. Maddox. 48 F.3d 555, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding "judge must provide a
reasoned exercise of discretion in order to justify a departure from the course agreed on
by the prosecution and defense"); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1439 ("[Rejecting a plea
implicating both branches of government solely out of concern for the district court's
scheduling is, under the facts of this case, impermissible."); United States v. Barker, 681
F.2d 589, 591-92 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding prosecutor's "decision to negotiate a plea" falls
within his "'discretion to decide not to pursue a particular prosecution any further'"
(citation omitted)); United States v. Noble, 653 F.2d 34, 36 (1 st Cir. 1981) (noting case
where plea reached to ease impact of conviction distinguishable from Ammidown
because, "This is not a case where acceptance of the plea agreement is both reasonable
and necessary to secure a legitimate and important prosecutorial interest"); United States
v.C.R. Bard Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287, 288 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding agreement reached
by "capable counsel" "should be accepted if it is reasonable" or "unless there is good
reason to reject it"); Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 834 ("Plea agreements are not solely within
the realm of courts." (citations omitted)); Hockadav. 359 A.2d at 148 ("If no proper
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cause exists to vitiate the plea, the trial court is obliged to accept it." (citation omitted));
Sandy, 935 P.2d at 1150-51 ("Judicial power to reject plea bargains serves to modify and
condition the absolute power of the prosecutor, consistent with the doctrine of separation
of powers, by establishing a check on the abuse of prosecutorial (executive)
prerogatives." (citations omitted)); Sparks, 759 P.2d at 184-85 ("'The question is not
what the judge would do if he were the prosecuting attorney, but whether he can say that
the action of the prosecuting attorney is such a departure from sound prosecutorial
principle as to mark it an abuse of prosecutorial discretion'" (citation omitted)).
Besides, even if this Court does not follow the reasoning delineated by MontiePs
cases, this Court should still reverse because the trial court exceeded the scope of its
authority even under the test proposed by the State. Under the State's test, "'[p]lea
bargains . . . go to the traditionally judicial function of determining what penalty to
impose.'" Aple. Br. at 32 (citation omitted). Thus, the trial court's "'adjudicatory and
sentencing responsibilities justify active scrutiny'" to determine whether the plea
agreement provides "too light a sentence." Id. at 33 (citations omitted); see State v.
Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1993) ("Sentencing should be conducted with full
information and with careful deliberation of all relevant factors."). In this case, the trial
court did not scrutinize the case at all, let alone actively scrutinize it. See. Section I.A.2;
Aplt. Br. at 9-14. Rather, the trial court rejected the plea agreement based on its fixed
policy to never waive firearms enhancements. Id
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C

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Applying Its Discretion
Arbitrarily.
The State argues the trial court did not apply its discretion arbitrarily because the

trial court considered all the factors previously listed in its "all relevant factors" section.
Aple. Br. at 34-35; see Aple. Br. at 26-27. However, as previously shown, the trial court
did not consider any of these purported factors. See Section I.A.2; Aplt. Br. at 9-14, 2124. Thus, because the trial court ignored the circumstances of Montiel's case and relied
entirely on its personal bias against firearms to reject Montiel's plea agreement, it abused
its discretion by rejecting the plea arbitrarily.3 R. 200:4-7; see Maddox, 48 F.3d at 558

3

In footnote 3, the State argues the trial court's policy "was not to 'never waive
firearms enhancements,'" but to "waive them only if the prosecutor proffered that the
enhancement was improperly charged or that the evidence was insufficient to support it."
Aple. Br. at 35 n. 3 (emphasis added) (quoting Aplt. Br. at 23). However, the State's
distinction is inaccurate. The trial court actually said it would waive a firearms
enhancement only if "you don't have any evidence . . . or there wasn't a firearm or your
witness is lying." R. 200:4-5 (emphasis added). If the trial court were willing to waive a
firearms enhancement where evidence was merely insufficient, it would have at least
listened to and considered the State's complaints of insufficient evidence in this case. IcL_
Moreover, the State's distinction is meaningless. In general, if there is a mistake in the
information or there is no evidence to support the charges, the prosecution will not reach
the plea agreement phase. See State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51,ljl5, 26 P.3d 223
(holding at preliminary hearing, "'the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to
support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant
committed it'" (citations omitted)). Similarly, here, the prosecutor made clear there was
no mistake in the information and there was some evidence to support the charges. R.
200:4-5. Accordingly, the trial court's statement that it would only consider waiving a
firearms enhancement if there was a mistake in the information or no evidence to support
the charge was simply a restatement that it would not waive firearms enhancements. See
Section I.A.2. Besides, there are numerous reasons beyond sufficiency of evidence that
justify a prosecutor entering a plea agreement. See. Sandy, 935 P.2d at 1151 (noting
prosecutors may accept plea due to "insufficiency of trial evidence, doubt as to the
13

(holding, to act without arbitrariness, trial court "must provide a reasoned exercise of
discretion in order to justify a departure from the course agreed on by the prosecution
and defense" (quotations and citations omitted)).
D.

This Court Should Reverse Because the Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion
Was Prejudicial.
The State claims the proper test to determine prejudice where a trial court rejects a

plea agreement is whether the defendant "'took any action in reliance on the tentative
plea agreement' that 'would substantially affect' his trial." Aple. Br. at 36 (citing State v.
Stringham. 2001 UTApp 13,ffl[15-16, 17P.3d 1153). However, in Stringham . this test
was applied not to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's
rejection of a plea but by his reliance on a plea that was never presented to the trial court
for consideration and that the trial court was later "unwilling to compel the State to
honor." See Stringham. 2001 UTApp 13 at^fl5 (citing State v. Moss. 921 P.2d 1021,
1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). Similarly, in Moss, this test was applied not to determine
whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's rejection of a plea but by his
reliance on a plea that was illegally accepted. See Moss, 921 P.2d at 1027. In both of
these cases, the defendants argued they were prejudiced by reliance on pleas they were
not legally entitled to. See Stringham. 2001 UT App 13 at 1J15; Moss. 921 P.2d at 1027.

admissibility of certain evidence," "the need to bring another felon to justice," "uncertain
success or conserving prosecutorial resources, or any other separate factor necessitating
acceptance").
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Accordingly, the test for prejudice necessarily measured their reliance on the unattainable
pleas rather than on the erroneous denial of the pleas. Id.
Alternatively, in this case, Montiel's plea agreement was legal and was agreed to
by the State. R. 200:4. In other words, his prejudice resulted not from mistakenly
relying on a plea he could not legally receive, but by being denied the opportunity to
enter a legal plea simply because the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea
based on a fixed policy. IcL at 4-7. Accordingly, the test to determine if Montiel was
prejudiced is whether, "[b]y proceeding with trial," he was "exposed to a greater possible
punishment than that which could have resulted from his guilty pleas." Hockaday, 359
A.2d at 149; see Maddox. 48 F.3d at 560 (same); United States v. Dele gal, 678 F.2d 47,
52 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding argument that defendant was not prejudiced was "baseless"
because he was "convicted of two counts" after the trial court rejected his plea to one
count); cf. United States v. Shepherd. 102 F.3d 558, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Although
'prejudice is more readily apparent where the rejection of the plea leads to conviction of
a greater offense than that offered in a plea agreement,5 prejudice may still exist when the
defendant is ultimately convicted of the same offenses to which she attempted to plead
guilty." (citations omitted)). Thus, because Montiel was forced to go to trial for an
enhanced first degree felony rather than pleading guilty to a third degree felony, he was
prejudiced by the trial court's abuse of discretion. R. 172-73; 200:4; 201-03.
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II.

ALTHOUGH MONTIEL PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS CLAIM
FOR APPEAL, HIS CONVICTION MERITS REVERSAL
REGARDLESS OF PRESERVATION BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS PLAIN ERROR AND
MONTIEL DID NOT INVITE THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR

This Court should not review Montiel's case for plain error because he properly
preserved his argument for appeal. Moreover, regardless of preservation, this Court
should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion was plain error and Montiel
did not invite the trial court's error.
A.

Montiel Properly Preserved His Claim For Appeal.
"The preservation rule serves two important policies." State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT

74,^11, 10 P.3d 346. "First, 'in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to
be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.'" IdL.
(citation omitted). "Second, a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an
objection with the strategy of 'enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then,
if that strategy fails,. . . claim[ingj on appeal that the Court should reverse.'" IJL
(alterations in original) (citation omitted). Here, Montiel properly preserved his issue for
appeal because both policy reasons behind the preservation rule are met.
First, the trial court was repeatedly given the opportunity to address and correct its
error. At the pretrial conference, the trial court, the State and Montiel engaged in an
extended discussion about the plea agreement. R. 200:4-7. Initially, the State explained
the details of the plea and said it agreed to the plea because the facts were not
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"presentable to the jury." Id at 4. Immediately, the trial court ruled, "Well, I don't waive
firearms enhancements, folks. You plead them, they're stuck unless I'm convinced that
there was some mistake in pleading." Id. Defense counsel then alerted the trial court to
the abusive nature of so hastily exercising its discretion by saying, "there's also the
additional reason . . . judicial economy." IcL at 4-5. However, the trial court ignored this
warning and said, "I don't care about judicial economy when people are alleged to have
used firearms in the commission of a crime. . . . I'm not going to waive the firearms
enhancement." Id, at 5. Next, the State urged the trial court to rethink its decision by
explaining the district attorney authorized to accept guilty pleas had weighed the case and
determined a plea was necessary to protect the public from "a dangerous person" and to
fulfill the State's "duties to the taxpayers" because a plea was the only way, judging from
the weakness of the evidence, to assure Montiel would be imprisoned. Id. at 5-6.
Finally, the State began to explain the victim's feelings on the plea. IcL. at 6. However,
before the State could convey the victim's feelings, the trial court interrupted to
summarily conclude the State had not "even told the [alleged victim]" about the plea and
to reiterate its ruling that it would not "accept any plea to a third-degree felony on the
basis of what I've heard." Id. at 6-7. Accordingly, the trial court's abuse of discretion in
refusing to consider the plea because of its blanket policy to never "waive firearms
enhancements" resulted not from Montiel's failure to alert the trial court to its error but
from the trial court's refusal to heed Montiel's and the State's repeated warnings.
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Second, Montiel did not forego objecting to the trial court's abuse of discretion
with the strategy of enhancing his chances of acquittal and then claiming abuse of
discretion on appeal if his strategy failed. Utah courts "will not require a party to
continue to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has rendered a
decision on the issue." State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4,^14, 20 P.3d 265; cf. State v.
Hansen, 2002 UT 114,1J20, 61 P.3d 1062 (holding "'defendant [is not required] to object
or to renew his motion to suppress at trial where the trial judge is also the judge who
ruled on the pretrial motion'" (citation omitted)). This is especially true where the trial
court makes clear it will not reconsider its ruling. See State v. Chapoose, 1999 UT
83,Tf8, 985 P.2d 915 (holding defendant did not invite error even though declined
interview offered after evaluator reached conclusions because "once the evaluator was
fully committed" the harm was done and the "only remedy was for [defendant] to obtain
a fresh evaluation by another person" and the "only way to get that was to go through
sentencing and then appeal, which he did"); J.W. v. State. 2001 UT App 208,^15 n. 4, 30
P.3d 1232 (holding sufficiency argument preserved because both parties argued evidence
during closing, trial court made finding, and "any further objections or motions regarding
this issue would have been futile"); Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Crook , 2000 UT App
217,^14, 6 P.3d 1143 (holding no need for party to move to dissolve where "it would
have been duplicative, costly, and probably futile"); cf State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,^f34,
989 P.2d 52 ("'"The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be
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futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance.'"" (citations omitted)).
Here, the trial court made clear it would not reconsider its fixed policy and stated
it would not accept a plea f,[u]nless you can tell me you don't have any evidence . . . or
there wasn't a firearm or your witness is lying."4 R. 200:5, 7. Thus, even though the
State believed its evidence was too weak to prove guilt, it could offer no plea that would
overcome the trial court's fixed policy against waiving firearms because it had some
evidence to show use of a firearm and it did not believe the witnesses were lying. IdL_ at
4-6. In other words, Montiel was not required to continue seeking a plea agreement
because his efforts would have been futile. See Section I.A.2; supra note 3. Besides,
there is no evidence to suggest Montiel, by later seeking a dismissal when the State failed
to present evidence against him, harbored a hidden strategy to forego pleading guilty.
See Aple. Br. at 11-12; R. 201:4-13; Hoffliine. 2001 UT 4 at Tfl4 (holding defendant did
not invite error by saying he "was not concerned" about challenged evidence after trial
court ruled it admissible). Further, no inference of a hidden strategy can be drawn
because, regardless of the possibility of a plea, a defendant is always entitled to request a
dismissal when the State fails to produce evidence against him. See State v. Smith, 2003

4

The State argues the trial court's statement, "I'm not going to accept any plea to
a third-degree felony on the basis of what I've heard," was an invitation to the parties to
"revisit" the plea because the trial court "would reconsider its ruling if either party cared
to present additional argument." Aple. Br. at 11. However, a trial court does not invite a
party to make additional arguments every time it says "on the basis of what I've heard."
On the contrary, this statement can also signify, as it did here, a definite ruling that "on
the basis of what I've heard" there is not enough evidence to grant a plea. R. 200:4-7.
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UT App 52^32, 65 P.3d 648 ("The State's failure to present evidence to satisfy this
necessary element of the offense would have entitled [defendant] to a dismissal on that
count." (citation omitted)), cert, granted. 76 P.3d 691 (Utah 2003); State v. Kihlstrom.
1999 UT App 289,lf8, 988 P.2d 949, cert, denied . 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) ("If the
prosecution has failed to present sufficient evidence to support its case, the trial court
should dismiss."). In fact, it would constitute deficient performance if defense counsel
did not move to dismiss when the State failed to present evidence against his client. See
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 comment ("A lawyer should act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf.").
R

Even If Montiel Had Not Preserved His Issue For Appeal, This Court Should
Still Reverse Because the Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion Was Plain Error.
The State argues Montiel must meet an enhanced plain error standard because

abuse of discretion under a plain error argument "'must be much more blatant than the
garden variety "abuse of discretion" featured in routine appellate review.5" Aple. Br. at
17 (quoting State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). However, Stirba
deals with abuse of discretion not in the context of plain error but in the context of a writ
for extraordinary relief. See Stirba, 972 P.2d at 922 (Abuse of discretion "for Rule
65B(d)(2)(A) writs [for extraordinary relief] must be much more blatant than the garden
variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in routine appellate review." (citing Renn v. Utah
State Bd. of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995) (also addressing writs for
20

extraordinary relief)). In reality, "plain error" itself is the more stringent standard and is
applied when "abuse of discretion" is not available because the issue was not preserved
for appeal. See State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781,785 n. 11 (Utah 1992) (noting need not
address abuse of discretion because "we address the issue on a plain error standard,
which is more deferential then [sic] a discretionary standard"); State v. EUifritz, 835 P.2d
170, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting that if defendant had challenged jurors for cause
standard of review would be abuse of discretion, but because there was no challenge
court must apply "more stringent standard of plain error").
Accordingly, this Court, if it reviews this case for plain error, should apply the
traditional plain error test. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^13 ("To demonstrate plain error,
a defendant must establish that '(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.'" (citation omitted)). Further, as outlined in
Montiel's opening brief, this Court should reverse because the trial court committed plain
error by rejecting the plea agreement based solely on its personal bias against firearms.
SeeAplt. Br. at 25-27.
C

Montiel Did Not Invite the Trial Court's Error.
"Generally, [this Court] will review objections raised for the first time on appeal

for plain error." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted).
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However, "[i]f a party through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from
objecting or has led the trial court into error, we will then decline to save that party from
the error." IcL The invited error doctrine "serves two purposes." State v. Anderson, 929
P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996). '"First, it fortifies our long-established policy that the trial
court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error. Second, it
discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a
hidden ground for reversal on appeal.5" IdL. (citations omitted). Here, the invited error
doctrine does not apply because both policy reasons for withholding the doctrine are met.
First, the trial court was given the opportunity to address and correct its abuse of
discretion. The invited error doctrine only applies if the defendant affirmatively led the
trial court into error. See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2002 UT App 130,^|10, 54 P.3d 640
(holding defendant did not invite error by proposing "'elements instruction containing
the very omission he complains of on appeal'" because he did not "actually l[ead] the
trial court into its erroneous action"), cert, granted, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002); State v.
Samora, 2002 UT App 384,^4, 13, 59 P.3d 604 (holding defendant did not invite error
by requesting "trial court waive or substantially reduce Defendant's fine so Defendant
could pay the restitution that he originally agreed to" because colloquy "lacked sufficient
clarity to construe it as an invitation or stipulation for the trial court to [impose a more
severe sentence on remand]"), cert, granted, 65 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2003). Here, Montiel
did not affirmatively lead the trial court into abusing its discretion by applying a blanket
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policy to reject the plea agreement. R. 200:4-7. Rather, he and the State repeatedly
attempted to dissuade the trial court from its ruling. See. Section II.A.
Second, Montiel did not intentionally mislead the trial court into its error to
preserve a hidden issue for appeal. See Sections I.A.2, II.A; supra n. 3. Instead, Montiel,
with the State's assistance, urged the trial court to reconsider its abusive fixed policy and
then continued to defend himself when it became clear the trial court would not
reconsider its fixed policy. See id.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Montiel's conviction because the trial court abused its
discretion by rejecting the plea agreement.
SUBMITTED this at*-

day of January, 2004.
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